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"Going to England": Irish Abortion Law
and the European Community*
By David Cole**
L INTRODUCTION
From the provincial perspective of United States scholars and
practitioners interested in reproductive rights, it seems that the princi-
pal point of Mary Ann Glendon's 1987 comparative study of abortion
and family law, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, is to demon-
strate that the U.S. Supreme Court's position on abortion was out of
the mainstream. In the book, Glendon presents a table that situates
the Western nations on a continuum with respect to their legal regula-
tion of abortion.2 Standing alone, far to one side, was the United
States, reflecting Glendon's contention that in Roe v. Wade,3 the
United States went further than any other Western nation in liberaliz-
ing access to abortion. Only five years after Glendon's book ap-
peared, the U.S. Supreme Court retreated from Roe v. Wade in its
decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.4 Arguably, in Casey, the
Supreme Court began to bring the U.S. position on abortion in line
with the positions of other Western nations by permitting abortion in
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Legal Practice, "The European Community in Evolution: Toward a Closer Political &
Economic Union."
** Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center;, Volunteer Staff Attor-
ney, Center for Constitutional Rights. I would like to thank Cara Miller, Nina Pillard,
Marie Pierre Richelle, and Suzanne Underwald for their comments and assistance in writ-
ing this Article. I represented Open Door Counselling, Ltd. in its case before the Euro-
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1. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DVORCE IN VEsTERN LAw (19S7).
2. Id. at 14 (table entitled "Legal Regulation of Abortion in TI enty Countries").
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 112 S. CL 2791 (1992).
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specified circumstances, but simultaneously insisting on the impor-
tance and sanctity of unborn life.5
Upon re-reading Glendon's book for a study of Ireland's abortion
laws, one is equally struck that Ireland also stands virtually alone,
although at the other end of the spectrum. In 1987, when Glendon
published her book, Ireland outlawed abortion altogether, subject
only to the defense of strict necessity. At that time, only Belgium's
abortion laws were as strict as Ireland's abortion laws, while all other
European nations had liberalized their abortion laws considerably.6
Ireland may now also be on the way to bringing its abortion pol-
icy in line with the policies of the majority of Western nations. If this
is the case, then much of the credit (or blame, depending on your
perspective on the matter) must be assigned to Ireland's connections
with the European Community (EC). Ireland has repeatedly tried to
insulate its abortion policy from the pressures of Europe's liberalizing
influence, but it has just as repeatedly found itself ensnared in Euro-
pean oversight. To paraphrase John Donne, Ireland is not an island to
itself, much as it might like to be on the question of abortion.
In some ways, the struggle over abortion in Ireland is a mirror
image of the abortion struggle in the United States. In both countries,
the issue has been so controversial that politicians have, for the most
part, sought to avoid it, with the result that major legal developments
have been sparked by judicial decisions or the fear thereof. But while
the judicial struggle for reproductive rights in the United States has
been driven largely by pro-choice forces, in Ireland this struggle has
been propelled by anti-abortion forces, who have repeatedly pursued
declarations of rights in the courts.
The impetus for the liberalization of abortion laws in Ireland has
come not from its domestic courts, but from European institutions,
international public pressure, and international law. Pro-choice liti-
5. Id. While the Casey Court narrowly rejected an invitation to overrule Roe out-
right, and in fact insisted on the importance of maintaining Roe's protections, it simultane-
ously reinterpreted Roe to permit the states to engage in much more interventionist
measures in the interest of the potential life of the fetus.
6. Until April 4, 1990, Belgium did not permit abortion. During 1990, the Belgian
parliament adopted a law that legalized abortion up to the fourteenth week of pregnancy
when the woman is "suffering distress." King Baudouin refused to sign the law and tempo-
rarily abdicated on April 4, 1990 so that the Belgian Council of Ministers could adopt and
promulgate the law. John Palmer, Belgium: Monarch Abdicates for a Day over Abortion
Issue, GuARDoAN, Apr. 5,1990, at 20; Belgium: King 'Unable to Rule' Due to New Abortion




gants, often finding themselves defendants in lawsuits brought by anti-
abortion groups, have refused to accept the legitimacy of the Irish
legal system on this matter and have taken their cases to both the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ). The decisions of these tribunals, combined with the
political and pragmatic pressures of living side-by-side with nations
that have adopted far more liberal attitudes toward abortion, have es-
tablished the first inroads on Ireland's strict abortion laws.
This Article will examine the interplay of European and domestic
Irish forces in the struggle for reproductive rights in Ireland from
1983, the year Ireland adopted a constitutional amendment guarantee-
ing the right to life of the unborn,7 to the present. The story of this
constitutional amendment demonstrates the futility of enforcing moral
isolationism in the European Community. That isolationism is impos-
sible even on an issue as strongly felt as abortion is by the Irish sug-
gests the integrationist force that a supranational human rights regime
can have on domestic legal culture.
H. THE IRISH LEGAL BACKGROUND IN 1983
It should not be surprising that Ireland, an overwhelmingly Cath-
olic country, has long imposed harsh prohibitions on abortion. Since
1861, Irish criminal law has provided that any woman who undergoes
an abortion, or any person who performs an abortion, has committed
a felony and may be punished by life imprisonment, with no excep-
tions.8 A companion provision makes it a misdemeanor to provide
any instruments or drugs to be used for abortions. 9
7. I.. CoNs. art. 40.33.
8. Under section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861:
Every Woman being with Child, who, with Intent to procure her own Miscarriage,
shall unlawfully administer to herself any Poison or other noxfous Thing, or shall
unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with the like Intent,
and whosoever, with Intent to procure the Miscarriage of any Woman, whether
she be or be not with Child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any In-
strument or other Means whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of a
felony and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the Discretion of the Court to
be kept in Penal Servitude for life.
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861,24 & 25 Vict. 236, ch. 100, § SS (Ir.). 'heoretically,
the use of the word "unlawfully" might permit some exceptions, JAmEs CASEY, CoNSTrr.
-rONAL LAw iN IRELAN 345 (1992), but the matter is quite theoretical, as no facilities in
Ireland provide abortions. Kate O'Callaghan, Ireland's Other Troubles; After Centuries of
Silence and Fear, the Irish Finally Confront the Reality of Abortion, L.A. TIrMEs, Jan. 3,
1993, at 22.
9. Section 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1S61 provides:
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In 1979, Ireland enacted the Health (Family Planning) Act, which
prohibits the publication or distribution of "any book or periodical
publication... which advocates or which might reasonably be sup-
posed to advocate the procurement of abortion." 10 This Act also re-
states the prohibitions on "the procuring of abortion" and the "sale,
importation into the State, manufacture, advertising or display of
abortifacients."I l
Notwithstanding this strict legal framework, Ireland's pro-life ad-
vocates grew concerned in the late 1960s and 1970s, when other Euro-
pean countries and the United States began to liberalize their
respective abortion laws. The liberalization began closest to home,
when Great Britain enacted the Abortion Act of 1967, which gov-
erned England, Scotland, and Wales. Prior to 1967, Great Britain had
the same criminal abortion provisions as Ireland. The 1967 Abortion
Act, however, made abortions before viability lawful if two doctors
certified that the child would be born with a serious handicap, or that
the pregnancy posed a risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman
or of any existing children in her family "greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated.' 1 2 Within two decades, virtually all of Europe fol-
lowed suit, amending previously broad prohibitions in order to allow
abortion under specified circumstances. 1 3
This state of affairs could have two effects on Ireland's domestic
abortion law, both of which would be anathema to the Irish anti-abor-
tion forces. First, in the short term, Europe's general liberalization of
abortion policy might serve as a safety valve, permitting Ireland's re-
strictions to continue in name, while allowing Irish women who could
afford to travel abroad to England or to other countries in Europe an
escape route by which to obtain abortions. 4 The travel option al-
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any Poison or other noxious Thing,
or any Instrument or Thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be
unlawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the Miscarriage of any Wo-
man, whether she be or not be with Child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
being convicted thereof shall be liable... to (imprisonment) for any Term not
exceeding five Years ....
Offenses Against the Person Act, ch. 100, § 59.
10. Health (Family Planning) Act, Pub. Gen. Acts, No. 20, § 12 (1979) (amending
Censorship of Publications Act, § 16 (1929)).
11. Id. § 10.
12. Abortion Act, 1967 (Eng.), § 1(1)(a), reprinted in U.N. FuND FOR POPULAOIoN
Acrivrrms, SURVEY OF LAWS ON FEr:RnrY CoNrmmoL, at 92 (1979).
13. GLENOON, supra note 1, at 11.
14. This arrangement meant that Irish women with the greatest access to political
power, Le., upper middle-class women, would not be denied access to abortion. Similarly,
in the United States, prior to Roe v. Wade, when some states permitted abortion and others
[Vol. 17:113
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lowed Irish people (and politicians) to avoid the difficult choices
posed by the particular circumstances of women seeking abortions,
yet permitted the Irish to retain an abstract commitment to the life of
the unborn. While this compromise might have been satisfactory to
politicians, it could not be satisfactory to those with strong pro-life
convictions.
Second, in the long term, the more Irish women availed them-
selves of the travel option, the greater the pressure might be to liber-
alize abortion within Ireland, as Ireland's legal prohibition would be
revealed as merely symbolic. "Abortion tourism" had already had
such a liberalizing effect on the rest of Europe, and Ireland's anti-
abortion movement sought to quash abortion tourism before it took
hold in the country.
In 1981, in an attempt to forestall this "sea-change""5 from over-
taking Ireland, a coalition of Irish anti-abortion groups instituted a
campaign for a constitutional amendment recognizing the right to life
of the unborn. 16 The campaign was extremely divisiveY but it
culminated in a 1983 constitutional amendment, approved by a
greater than a two-to-one margin, that guaranteed protection for the
right to life of the unborn. This amendment, which became the eighth
amendment to the Irish Constitution and is codified as article 40.3.3,18
provides: "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and,
with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in
did not, abortion was available to those women with the resources and ability to travel to a
jurisdiction that provided lawful abortions. The uneducated, uninformed, and indigent
were substantially restricted in their ability to obtain abortions.
15. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
16. ToM HEssICEm, THE SncoND PAwrmo,4wG OF IRELA7)?: THm Amonno'- REr-
EPRENDit OF 1983 1-4 (1990). See Cathleen M. Colvin, Comment, Society for the Protec-
tion of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan: Irish Abortion Law and the Free
Movement of Services in the European Community, 15 FoRDAm IN_'L LJ. 476, 492-94
(1991-92) (detailing the effect of Europe's abortion laws on Ireland); id. at 494-97 (on
efforts to enact the eighth amendment).
17. As Hesketh described it:
[The referendum campaign] gave rise to the first nationwide clash between or-
ganised lobbies in which the political parties were not officially involved; it
strained relations between the churches to breaking point whilst posing dilemmas
for each church individually, it divided deeply both Fine Gael and Labour;, and it
aligned right and left within Irish society in a more pronounced manner than any
previous issue.
HEs&um, supra note 16, at xi.
18. I,. CONST. art. 40.33.
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its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and
vindicate that right. ' ' 19
1/. THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE: 1983-92
From the vantage point of its proponents, Ireland's eighth
amendment was designed to "copperfasten" existing protections for
the unborn and to head off changes that might result from judicial
reform or political pressures.20 In fact, the amendment has produced
exactly the opposite result. Since 1983, the validity of Ireland's abor-
tion restrictions has been repeatedly questioned in various legal and
political forums. And today, women's rights to abortion in Ireland,
while still extremely constrained, are more liberal than they have ever
been.
Like the eighth amendment itself, all of the subsequent develop-
ments in Ireland's abortion laws have arisen from efforts by anti-abor-
tion forces to insulate Ireland from the influence of its European
neighbors. Ironically, each attempt to enforce the amendment has re-
opened the abortion issue politically and legally, and has led to further
inroads on Ireland's otherwise total prohibition on abortion.
Three legal cases form the outline of the story. Two cases in-
volved attempts by the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
(S.P.U.C.) (Ireland) Ltd., an Irish anti-abortion group, to halt the dis-
semination of information within Ireland about lawful abortion alter-
natives abroad. The first of these actions, Attorney General ex rel.
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (S.P.U.C.) (Ireland)
Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.,21
eventually reached the ECHR in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman
v. Ireland ("Open Door").2 The second action, Society for the Protec-
19. Id.
20. "Those seeking the amendment to the constitution asserted that they were seeking
only to 'copperfasten' the existing law lest any future government might seek to change it."
Robert A. Pearce, The Irish Abortion Controversy, 142 NEw L.J. 283 (Feb. 28, 1992). See
also Vicky Randall, The Politics of Abortion in Ireland, in TAE NEw POLITICS OF ABOR.
TION 67-69 (Joni Lovenduski & Joyce Outshoorn eds., 1986).
21. Att'y Gen. (S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well
Woman Centre Ltd., 1988 I.R. 593 (Ir. H. Ct.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1988 I.R, 619 (Ir.
S.C.). In this case, the plaintiff S.P.U.C. "had originally instituted the proceedings in its
own name. On its locus standi to do this being challenged, the Attorney General gave
leave for his name to be used in relator proceedings, and the action continued with the
Attorney as nominal plaintiff." CASEY, supra note 8, at 347 n.75.
22. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)
[hereinafter Open Door]. The abbreviation "Open Door" is used to refer generally to the
entire litigation including the action before the ECHR.
[Vol. 17:11:3
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tion of Unborn Children (S.P.U.C.) (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan ("Gro-
gan"),23 was ultimately heard by the EC. 24 The third case, Attorney
General v. X and Others ("X"),2 filed by the Attorney General,
sought to enjoin a fourteen-year-old Irish girl from travelling to Eng-
land for an abortion. Although this case was resolved within the Irish
legal system without recourse to European legal principles, it too had
dramatic implications for European-Irish relations.
The story of these cases and the political battles surrounding
them are complicated chronologically by the fact that each case has a
very different lifeline. The Open Door case, for example, is both the
first and the last case in the overall story, because although the case
began in the Irish judicial system in June 1985, it was not finally re-
solved until October 1992, when the ECHR issued its decision. In the
intervening years, the Grogan and X cases were decided, and each of
these decisions, in turn, had an impact on the subsequent Open Door
decision by the ECHR.
A. Open Door. Closing the Channels to Lawful Abortion
The fact that abortion has been legal in England since 1967 has
meant that many Irish women have escaped the strict dictates of Irish
criminal law by obtaining lawful abortions in London clinics. Irish
criminal abortion laws do not extend to conduct beyond its borders,
and every year thousands of Irish women travel abroad to obtain
abortions.26 The practice is so well established that the phrase "going
23. S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, 1989 LIL 753 (Ir. I-L Ct.), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 1989 LR. 760 (Ir. S.C.) [hereinafter Grogan].
24. Case C-159190, S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
25. Att'y Gen. v. X and Others (Ir. L Ct. 1992), rev'd (Ir. S.C. 1992), reprinted in THE
ATroRNEY GENERAL v. X AND Omwms: JUDGMENTS OF HE IGH COURT AND SUPREME
COURT WrrI SuaNnssioNs MADE BY CouNsF.. to Tm SuPRNm COURT (Sunniva
McDonagh ed., 1992) [hereinafter McDonagh].
26. The estimates vary on precisely how many Irish women travel to Great Britain
each year for abortions. One source states that over 33,700 Irish women travelled to Great
Britain from 1969 to 1984 to obtain an abortion, and that in each year from 19, to 1984,
over 3,000 women from Ireland obtained an abortion in Great Britain. CHrUsToFHJER
TmTzE & STANLEY K. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD REVIEW 52, tbl. 3
(Alan Guttmacher Institute ed., 6th ed. 1986). The highest estimate comes from France's
Family Planning Movement, which states that 15,000 Irish women make the trip each year
for an abortion. Anthony J. Blinken, Womb for Debate: Europe's Abortion Wars, NEw
REPUBLic, July 8, 1991, at 12. Most estimates are in the range of 4,000 to 6,O0W Irish wo-
men travelling abroad annually for abortions. See Edward Pilkington, More Irish Women
Travelling for Abortions, IR. Tnms, July 13, 1992, at 3 (noting that 4,152 Irish women
travelled abroad for abortions in 1991, and 4,063 women travelled abroad for abortions in
1990); Abbie Jones, Irish Court Rules Permission of Teen Rape Victim to Travel for Abor-
tion Heats Up the ssue, Cm. TRI., Mar. 8, 1992, at 1 (4,000-8,00 Irish women travelling
1993]
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to England" has become a euphemism in Irish parlance for having an
abortion.27 Nonetheless, only after the 1983 right-to-life referendum
did this practice become the focus of law enforcement efforts. Per-
haps emboldened by its success in enacting the eighth amendment, the
S.P.U.C. decided to target family-planning clinics that had been advis-
ing Irish women about the availability of lawful abortions in England.
In June 1985, the S.P.U.C. sued two such Dublin-based clinics, Open
Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd., asserting
that the clinics' activities violated the eighth amendment's right to life
of the unborn. 8
These clinics engaged in "non-directive counselling" on preg-
nancy matters, which consisted of informing pregnant women of all
their legal options, including childbirth, adoption, and obtaining an
abortion in another country. As the Irish Supreme Court stated,
"non-directive counselling to pregnant women would never involve
the actual advising of an abortion as the preferred option but neither,
of course, could it permit the giving of advice for any reason ...
against choosing to have an abortion."29 If a woman chose to have an
abortion, the clinics referred her to an appropriate medical facility in
Great Britain, and in some cases assisted her with travel
arrangements.
On December 19, 1986, the Irish High Court issued a declaration
that the two clinics' activities violated the eighth amendment to the
Irish Constitution because the information they provided assisted in
the destruction of the right to life of the unborn.30 The clinics had
argued that the right to life of the unborn should be balanced against
the privacy, speech, and associational rights of the clinics and their
patients. The High Court, however, concluded that the rights of the
clinics and patients were overridden by the "fundamental" right to life
of the unborn child: "The qualified right of privacy, the rights of asso-
ciation and freedom of expression and the right to disseminate infor-
abroad for abortions each year). Estimates are difficult in part because many women in
fear give false addresses when obtaining abortions.
27. Weekend Edition: Interview with Ruth Riddick (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Mar.
20, 1993).
28. While article 403.3 appears to refer only to "the State," Irish constitutional juris-
prudence does not include a "state action" doctrine, so constitutional rights operate against
private individuals as well as government actors. Brian Wilkinson, Abortion, the Irish Con-
stitution and the EEC, Pure. LAW 20, 22 (Spring 1992).
29. S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 618, 621 (Ir. S.C.).
30. S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 593 (Ir. H. Ct.).
[Vol. 17:113
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mation cannot be invoked to interfere with such a fundamental right,
as the right to life of the unborn.
3 1
The clinics appealed, and on March 16, 1988, the Irish Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the High Court's decision.32 Like the High
Court, the Supreme Court gave short shrift to the clinics' arguments
that their rights and the constitutional rights of their clients would be
violated by an injunction suppressing information about lawful abor-
tions elsewhere. The Court ruled that "no right could constitutionally
arise to obtain information the purpose of the obtaining of which was
to defeat the constitutional right to life of the unborn child."3 3 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court permanently enjoined the clinics
from assisting pregnant women within the jurisdiction to travel
abroad to obtain abortions by referral to a clinic, by the making for
them of travel arrangements, or by informing them of the identity
and location of and the method of communication with a specified
clinic or clinics or otherwise.a'
From the S.P.U.C.'s standpoint, the Open Door litigation was, at
this point, an unmitigated success. The case established that the Irish
judiciary had an obligation, equal to that of the executive and legisla-
tive branches, to protect the right to life of the unborn. It proclaimed
that right as virtually absolute, trumping important constitutional
rights of the already living, such as the freedom of expression and pri-
vacy. In addition, Open Door laid the foundation for cutting off an
important avenue for the liberalization of Ireland's abortion laws,
since it prohibited the dissemination of information about the availa-
bility of lawful abortions abroad. The Supreme Court's rationale ap-
peared to ban virtually any expression that might offer assistance to a
pregnant woman seeking an abortion, and its injunction, particularly
given the final words "or otherwise," was potentially limitless. -5;
The clinics, however, were not willing to accept the Supreme
Court's injunction as the final word, and they sought further relief
under the European Convention on Human Rights ("Convention"),3 6
to which Ireland is a signatory. As a signatory to the Convention, a
nation agrees that the ECHR may adjudicate complaints by private
31. Id. at 617.
32. S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, 19S I.R. at 618 (Ir. S C.).
33. Id. at 625.
34. Id. at 627.
35. Id.
36. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Frcedams, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955) [hereinafter Convention].
19931
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individuals concerning the deprivation of human rights, and each sig-
natory nation is obliged to comply with the ECHR's judgments.
Although the Irish Supreme Court could bar the communication of
information about abortion activities in other signatory nations,
thereby insulating Ireland in part from the social and moral pressures
of its European neighbors, the Irish Court could not insulate its own
order from review by the ECHR.
In September 1988, the clinics, joined by two counselors and po-
tential clients,37 filed applications with the European Commission on
Rights ("Commission").38 They argued that the Irish Supreme Court
judgment in Open Door violated articles 8, 10, and 14 of the Conven-
tion, which respectively guarantee the rights to privacy, expression,
and equal protection.39
The clinics emphasized their free expression claims. 40 There was
no dispute that the injunction interfered with their rights to impart
and receive information under article 10(1), as it expressly prohibited
speech.4' Indeed, the injunction was a classic prior restraint, and as in
U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, prior restraints are especially
disfavored under the Convention.42 The heart of the dispute focused
on whether the restrictions could be justified under article 10(2),
which permits restraints on speech where they are "prescribed by law"
37. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9.
The clinics were joined by Ms. Bonnie Maher and Ms. Ann Downes, counselors for the
Dublin Well Woman Clinic, and by Mrs. X and Ms. Maeve Geraghty, potential clients.
38. Id. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, an application must first
be filed with the Commission, which rules on the application's "admissibility." If the ap-
plication is found admissible, the Commission issues a recommendation on the applica-
tion's merits and strives to resolve the dispute amicably. Only those cases that are referred
by the Commission or a signatory nation are heard by the ECHR, whose decisions are,
theoretically, binding on the signatories. Thus, while a private party can file an application
with the Commission, it has no independent right to seek a review by the ECHR if neither
the Commission nor the signatory nation request such review. DONNA GONIEN, SHORT
GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONvENTION ON HUMAN Riorss 152 (1991).
39. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 54 (Commission Report).
40. Id. at 55.
41. Article 10(1) of the Convention provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inter-
ference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not pre-
vent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
Convention, supra note 36, at 230.
42. Sunday Tunes v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1979).
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and "necessary in a democratic society" to further any of a number of
specified aims.
Ireland contended that the injunction was justified to protect the
rights of unborn children, to protect morals, and to prevent crime. 4
Its principal argument, echoing the rationales of the Irish courts, was
that the right to life of the unborn child was primary and that "lesser"
claims like the rights to expression, privacy, and equal protection
could not trump the right to life. Ireland invoked several Convention
articles in support of this contention, including article 2, which Ireland
interpreted as protecting the right to life of the unborn; 45 article 17,
which bars actions that would destroy the rights and freedoms guaran-
teed in the Convention; and article 60, which provides that the Con-
vention will not limit "any of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Con-
tracting Party."'47 Ireland argued that both the European Convention
and the Irish Constitution guaranteed the right to life of the unborn,
that the right should prevail over all competing rights except possibly
the right to life of the mother, and that therefore its injunction was
justified.1a
The clinics' principal contention was that the injunction prohib-
ited Irish citizens from speaking about underlying conduct that was
43. Id. at 29. See also Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 55 (Commission
Report). Article 10(2) of the Convention provides:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of na-
tional security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputa-
tion or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention, supra note 36, at 230.
44. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 54-55 (Commission Report).
45. Article 2 of the Convention provides that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be pro-
tected by law." Convention, supra note 36, at 224.
46. Article 17 of the Convention provides:
Nothing in [the] Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Id at 234.
47. Article 60 of the Convention provides: "Nothing in this Convention shall be con-
strued as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other
agreement to which it is a Party." Id. at 250.
48. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A) at 23-27 (1992).
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wholly lawful to undertake.49 If Irish women could legally travel to
England to get an abortion, the clinics asked, what interest could Ire-
land assert in barring people from providing non-directive informa-
tion about that activity? Given the central importance of free
expression in a democratic society, it could not be "necessary in a
democratic society" to bar people from talking about an activity that
the democratic society permits.
The clinics also argued that the injunction was not "necessary"
because it was wholly ineffective.50 The very information Ireland
sought to censor-the identity, addresses, and phone numbers of
abortion clinics elsewhere-was available to resourceful Irish women
from several sources other than the clinics, such as English telephone
books, foreign magazines, and London's directory information.51 As a
result, the clinics argued, it was not at all clear that the injunction
accomplished its asserted ends-the saving of fetuses from abortion.
On the contrary, statistics suggested that the injunction had caused no
diminution in the number of Irish women travelling to Great Britain
for abortions.52
Significantly, both of the clinics' principal arguments were predi-
cated on the fact that Europe, and specifically England, had legalized
abortion. It was only because Ireland's neighbors had legalized abor-
tion that the clinics could argue that the information sought to be sup-
pressed concerned lawful activity. As long as relatively open channels
of communication existed between European nations, there would al-
ways be ways to obtain information about lawful abortions abroad. In
addition, as long as the borders between nations remained relatively
open, women seeking abortions would travel for that purpose. At the
same time, neither argument required the Court to rule on whether
abortion itself was a protected right under the Convention. 3
49. Id. at 20-21.
50. I&. at 11-12, 26.
51. Id. at 18.
52. Id. at 11-12.
53. The applicants also argued that the injunction violated articles 8 and 14 of the
Convention, which guarantee a right to privacy and equal protection, respectively. Id. at
32. An article 8 ruling would have required a determination as to whether abortion is
protected by the right to privacy, a determination the Court and Commission were appar-
ently not ready to make, as neither body reached that issue. Id. at 20-21, 32. An equal
protection violation under article 14 could be established only by demonstrating unequal
treatment with respect to another right separately protected by the Convention. See J.E.S,
FAWCETr, APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENrION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 295-96
(1987). Moreover, the direct victims of the privacy and equal protection claims were not
the clinics, but their patients.
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On March 7, 1991, the Commission found that the injunction vio-
lated applicants' rights under article 10 of the Convention. 4 The ma-
jority of the Commission rested its report on neither of the applicants'
principal arguments, adopting instead an argument that the injunction
was not "prescribed by law," because it was not reasonably foresee-
able that the constitutional amendment would prohibit the non-direc-
tive counselling that applicants conducted.-s The Commission noted
that the applicants' expression was not proscribed by any provision of
criminal law, nor did their expression constitute a civil tort.-6 In addi-
tion, the Commission noted, article 40.3.3 on its face addressed only
the State, not private individuals. 57
The Commission's rationale, like a vagueness determination in
U.S. courts, avoided the normative issues at stake in the case. Be-
cause the Commission found the law insufficiently precise, it did not
reach Ireland's arguments that it had a near-absolute right to protect
the right to life of the unborn, or that this right to life is guaranteed by
the Convention. Nor did the Commission take a position on appli-
cants' arguments that Ireland could not proscribe counselling about
the availability of lawful abortions in other states. Instead, the Com-
mission merely reasoned that Ireland could not ban counselling under
a provision as open-ended and vague as article 40.3.3. Thus, its deci-
sion left open the possibility that the injunction could be maintained
under a more specific law.
Several concurring members of the Commission concluded that
the restriction on speech was invalid because it was not "necessary in
a democratic society.""8 These members relied squarely on the clinics'
principal contentions that Ireland had forbidden discussion about
54. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.RL at 58 (Commission Report).
55. Id. The "prescribed by law" requirement is analogous to the "vagueness" doctrine
in American constitutional jurisprudence and serves similar purposes of guaranteeing no-
tice, limiting official discretion, and avoiding the chilling of protected expression. To be
"prescribed by law," the government's action "must have some basis in domestic law,
which itself must be adequately accessible and be formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the individual to regulate his conduct, if need be with appropriate advice." Bar-
thold v. Germany, 90 Eur. Ct. . (ser. A) at 21 (1985). The individual must be able "to
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a
given action may entail." Sunday Tunes, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 31. Moreover, while
the law may confer a reasonable amount of discretion on government officials, the law
must indicate the extent and manner of exercise of this discretion. Case of Silver, 61 Eur.
Ct. -.L (ser. A) at 33 (1983). See also Gra.ued v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (listing
similar purposes for vagueness doctrine as applied to restrictions on speech).
56. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct H.R. at 56-57 (Commission Report).
57. Id. at 57. But see supra note 28.
58. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 64-67, 70-72 (Commission Report).
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legal conduct (in other states) and that the injunction had not dimin-
ished the number of abortions in Ireland, but had merely delayed the
time when women could obtain abortions, thereby increasing the dan-
gers to women's health and safety without demonstrably benefiting
the unborn.5 9
Both the Commission and Ireland sought to have the matter
heard by the ECHR. However, before turning to that Court's deci-
sion, we must return to Ireland for two intervening cases.
B. Grogan: Abortion as an Economic Right
Once the S.P.U.C. obtained its injunction against Open Door
Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre, it sought to extend the
principle to other sources of information. The S.P.U.C.'s next targets
were student pamphlets that listed the names, addresses, and phone
numbers of abortion clinics in England.6° In Grogan,61 filed in Sep-
tember 1989, the S.P.U.C. sought to enjoin three student associations
from publishing and distributing such information. 6 The defendant
student groups argued that the requested injunction would violate the
Treaty of Rome, which governs the European Economic Community
(EEC).63 The Treaty of Rome guarantees the right to travel among
Member States to receive services, including medical services,64 and
the students maintained that Irish citizens therefore had a right to re-
ceive and impart information about medical services that were lawful
in another Member State.65
The Irish High Court, hearing the case in the first instance, de-
cided to refer questions concerning the applicability of EC law to the
ECJ.66 The High Court asked the ECJ to answer three questions: (1)
59. See id. at 72.
60. S.P.U.C. v. Coogan, 1989 I.R. 738 (Ir. S.C.); Grogan, 1989 I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 1989 I.R 760 (Ir. S.C.).
61. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.).
62. Id. at 758.
63. TREATY ESTABLiSHING TmE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY],
tit. H, ch. 2, arts. 59-60.
64. In 1984, the Advocate General of the ECJ determined that under Convention arti-
cle 59, "the freedom to provide services includes the freedom, for the recipients of services,
to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being obstructed
by restrictions ... and that tourists, persons receiving medical treatment, and persons
travelling for the purpose of education or business are to be regarded as being recipients of
services." See Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro,
1984 E.C.R. 377, 403.
65. Grogan, 1989 LR. at 761 (Ir. S.C.).
66. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 758 (Ir. H. Ct.). Under article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, a
domestic court may refer questions concerning EC law to the ECJ where it "considers that
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Is the provision of abortion a service within the meaning of the
Treaty?; (2) Can Member States prohibit the distribution of specific
information about the location of and means of communication with
abortion clinics in another Member State?; and (3) Does a person in
one Member State have a right under Community law to distribute
such information? 67 The High Court also declined to grant the
S.P.U.C.'s request for an interlocutory injunction pending the out-
come of its referral.
The S.P.U.C. appealed to the Irish Supreme Court, which re-
versed the High Court's refusal to enter an interlocutory injunction. S
The decision to refer questions to the ECJ was not appealable, how-
ever, and therefore the Supreme Court could not reverse that deci-
sion. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court left little doubt that it did not
think much of the referral. Reiterating its position on the absolute
value of the right to life, the Court opined that "where the right
sought to be protected is that of a life, there can be no question of a
possible or putative right which might exist in European law as a co-
rollary to the right to travel so as to avail of services."6 9 In his sepa-
rate opinion, Judge Walsh insisted that whatever happened, the Irish
Supreme Court would have the final word:
Any answer to the reference received from the Court of Justice of
the European Communities will have to be considered in the light
of our own constitutional provisions. In the last analysis only this
Court can decide finally what are the effects of the interaction of
the eighth amendment of the Constitution and the third amendment
of the Constitution.70
While the Court did not directly refute the established principle that
Community law takes precedence over all national law, including con-
stitutional and fundamental rights,71 it came very close to doing so,
reflecting once again Irish sensitivity to European pressure on the
abortion issue.
a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment." EEC TrATY art.
177.
67. Grogan, 1989 LR. at 758 (Ir. H. CL).
68. Grogan, 1989 I.R. at 760 (Ir. S.C.).
69. Id. at 765.
70. Id. at 768-69. The third amendment to the Irish Constitution governs Ireland's
relationship with the EEC and the European Coal and Steel Community, and provides that
laws, acts, or measures adopted by these Communities have the force of law in Ireland. IR.
CONST. art. 29.43.
71. Case 10677, Amministrazione delle Fmanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978
E.C.R. 629, 643-44.
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For its part, the ECJ, perhaps concerned about a showdown with
the Irish judiciary, went out of its way to avoid deciding the issue. It
recognized that abortion is a service within the meaning of the Treaty
of Rome, but held that the student groups lacked standing to raise the
claim that the requested injunction would interfere with their rights
because they lacked an economic relationship with the English provid-
ers of abortion services. Exercising the "passive virtues,"72 the ECJ
did not then need to decide whether barring the provision of informa-
tion about lawful services in a Member State violated the Treaty.
While many have criticized the ECJ's opinion,73 the alternative
might well have been worse from the standpoint of reproductive rights
advocates. The Advocate General, who makes recommendations to
the ECJ much as the Commission makes reports to the ECHR, had
determined that the questions were properly raised, but then con-
cluded on the merits that Ireland's informational ban was justified.74
Under the Treaty of Rome, the free movement of services may be
restricted for objectively justified public policy imperatives. 75 The
Advocate General found that Ireland must be granted a wide margin
of discretion in determining what is necessary to meet its constitu-
tional policy of protecting the right to life of the unborn.7 6 He deter-
mined that while other restrictions, such as "a ban on pregnant
women going abroad" for abortions, would not be justified, the re-
striction on information was the least restrictive means available to
Ireland to further its public policy objective.77 He did not consider
72. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1986).
73. Dena T. Sacco & Alexia Brown, Regulation of Abortion in the European Commu-
nity: Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan, 33 HARV. INT'L.
L.J. 291-304 (1992); Deirdre Curtin, Case C-159190, The Society for the Protection of Un-
born Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan, Judgment of 4 October 1991 29 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 585 (1992); Colvin, supra note 16, at 476; Siofra O'Leary, The Court of Justice as a
Reluctant Constitutional Adjudicator: An Examination of the Abortion Information Case,
17 EUR. L. REv. 138 (1992).
74. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven, June 11, 1991, Case C-159/90,
S.P.U.C. v. Grogan, [1991] 2 CEC 539, 553.
75. Case 205/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 11 E.C.R. 3755, 3808
(1986), 2 C.M.L.R. 69, 102 (1987); Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 9 E.C.R.
1219, 1231 (1975), 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 155 (1976) ("genuine and sufficiently serious threat to
public policy" required to justify derogation). The source for this principle is article 56 of
the Treaty of Rome, which provides: "The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken
in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health."
76. Case C-159/90, S.P.U.C. v. Grogan, [1991] 2 CEC at 566.
77. Id. at 567.
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whether providing counter-information and counselling would be a
less restrictive alternative.
The Advocate General then considered whether the restriction
on abortion information was consistent with article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.78 He reasoned that where the
ECJ reviews a national rule within the scope of EEC law, it must con-
sider the rule in light of the Community's human rights principles,
which are guided by such sources as the European Convention on
Human Rights. 9 The Advocate General concluded that the ban in-
terfered with the students' rights under article 10, but found that inter-
ference justified because of the wide margin of discretion that must be
afforded Ireland on this fundamental moral issue.'
The Advocate General's opinion, while reaching the same result
as the ECI, did so by reasoning that would have been much more
damaging to the cause of reproductive rights advocates. Still, even the
Advocate General's opinion insisted on the interplay between Euro-
pean rights and Irish national law, and held that some restrictions on
Irish women would be impermissible, including a ban on travel abroad
to seek an abortion.
While the ECJ and the Advocate General both declined to over-
turn Ireland's informational ban, the ECJ did so on grounds that
raised as many questions as it resolved. By declining to adopt the
Advocate General's view, the ECJ left open the distinct possibility
that in a case presenting the requisite economic ties, it might reach a
different result. Moreover, in concluding that abortion was a service
covered by the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ, like the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights, served notice that Ireland's treatment of ac-
cess to abortion was not simply a matter of Irish law. Europe's
pressures on Ireland continued.
C. The X Case Abortion as a Right to Life
The third chapter in the story of Ireland's right-to-life amend-
ment takes place within Ireland proper, but again the issue concerns
the interrelationship between Ireland and its neighbors. This time the
action was instituted not by the S.P.U.C., but by the Irish government.
In fact, it is extremely unlikely that the S.P.U.C. would have brought
78. Id. at 570-73.
79. Id. at 570.
80. Id. at 574.
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the case, for the action was certain to backfire politically. The govern-
ment's reason for bringing the action remains a mystery.
The case arose when a fourteen-year-old girl, to be known pub-
licly forevermore only as X, discovered she was pregnant after being
raped by her friend's father.81 She and her parents decided to go to
England for an abortion. However, before leaving, her parents called
the Irish prosecutors to see whether a DNA test should be done on
the fetus to determine the identity of the father for evidence in the
rape case.82 The prosecutors made some inquiries within the office
and concluded that such evidence would be inadmissible. The next
day, X and her parents travelled to England to make arrangements for
the abortion. The same day, the Attorney General applied ex parte
for an injunction, pursuant to the eighth amendment to the Irish Con-
stitution, barring the girl from getting an abortion.84
The High Court granted the injunction after an expedited in cam-
era hearing.' The Court reasoned that unless there was an immediate
and inevitable risk to the life of the mother, the right to life of the
unborn child had to take precedence, because an abortion necessarily
terminates the life of the fetus.86 While the Court acknowledged that
X faced a real risk of suicide, "the risk that the defendant may take
her own life if an order is made is much less and of a different order of
magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn will be termi-
nated if the order is not made."
The High Court also considered X's arguments that EC law guar-
anteed a right to travel to Member States to receive abortion serv-
ices. 8 The Court acknowledged that its order would infringe that
right, but determined that the infringement would be justified by pub-
lic policy.8 9 Like the Advocate General in Grogan, the High Court
reasoned that Ireland must be granted broad discretion in how it en-
forces its citizens' moral judgment about protecting the right to life of
the unborn child. But while the Advocate General read EC law to
prohibit a travel restriction, the High Court found the discretion
81. Att'y Gen. v. X and Others, reprinted in McDonagh, supra note 25, at 9.
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 9-12.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 15-19.
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broad enough to permit such a restriction.90 The Court noted that the
European Convention on Human Rights afforded broad discretion to
Member States on moral matters, and that there was nothing explicit
in EC law that prohibited derogations from Treaty rights "aris[ing]
because of deeply held convictions on moral issues." 91 Moreover, the
Court noted, granting wide discretion to Member States would further
the EC's development by allowing for moral differences rather than
"impos[ing] a spurious and divisive uniformity on its members." 2
The High Court advanced no affirmative moral or normative ar-
gument under Community law for restricting X's travel. Instead, it
simply insisted that Ireland ought to have wide latitude in violating
EC rights when moral issues were at stake-latitude so broad that no
affirmative argument was needed. The Court's only argument was di-
rected not toward establishing the morality of the restriction, but
rather toward demonstrating the importance of respecting a Member
State's moral judgments, whatever they may be. This argument, how-
ever, cuts both ways. Respect for the moral commitments of Member
States could just as easily be construed to bar one Member State from
seeking to extend its moral restrictions to another Member State with
a different set of moral convictions. 93
The High Court's argument ironically resembles an argument
some reproductive rights advocates make to the opposite end: namely,
that because abortion is a fundamental moral issue about which rea-
sonable people disagree, the state should not enforce any particular
resolution of the issue on its citizenry.94 The High Court employed
90. Id. at 18.
91. id.
92. Id.
93. Cf. Seth Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law. Abortion, the Right to
Trave and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451,464-
87, 519 (1992) (arguing that in the U.S. system of federalism, "the moral commitments of
each state [must] be tempered by a regard for the commitments of its neighbors; the moral
sovereignty of each state ends at its borders .... ).
94. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2806-07, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court justified a right to reproductive choice in these terms:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always
shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating
a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion
offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our
decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve
these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice
in the matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances in ,hich the pregnancy
is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest ....
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this argument to ward off the imposition of EC values on Ireland, but
the very same argument can be used against the imposition of the
Irish majority's values on its citizens.
The High Court's decision sparked massive protests. 5 The no-
tion that Ireland would enjoin a fourteen-year-old rape victim from
travelling to another country to obtain a lawful abortion there
shocked both the Irish people and the international community and
brought unwanted attention to the issue of Ireland's relations with its
neighbors at a time when Ireland's place in the EC was being
reexamined. 6
Within ten days, the Irish Supreme Court reversed the injunc-
tion.97 The Supreme Court's rationale carefully avoided virtually all
of the controversial aspects of the case. It did not render a decision on
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
95. "The young women demonstrators who scuffled with police outside the Irish par-
liament this week waved banners saying 'Get your rosaries off our ovaries' ... The plight
of the 14 year old rape victim ... has produced a dramatic backlash against Ireland's strict
anti-abortion laws, to the point where a growing number of Irish politicians may be ready
to countenance legalising abortion in certain circumstances." Tim Coone, An English Solu-
tion to an Irish Problem, FiN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28,1992, § I, at 2; see also Girl Cleared
to Travel for Abortion, FAcrs oN Fnmn WoRLD NEws Dio., Feb. 27, 1992, at 134, D2
("[t]here had been almost daily protests in Dublin against the court's injunction"),
The strong public response apparently caused the government to rethink its position,
at least behind closed doors. According to the Washington Post, "[iunformed sources in
Dublin said the government put enormous pressure-public and private--on the five jus-
tices [of the Supreme Court] to overturn the ruling, warning that the case was tearing
Ireland apart and embarrassing the country overseas." Glenn Frankel, Irish Supreme
Court Allows Teenager to Seek Abortion, WAsH. Post, Feb. 27, 1992, at A27. The govern-
ment did not change its legal position before the Supreme Court, however, and argued
there for affirmance of the High Court injunction.
96. Jon O'Brien of the Irish Family Planning Association on February 17, 1992, con-
demned the injunction: "The state appears more concerned with protecting the procreative
rights of rapists than with protecting the rights of their victims." See Girl Cleared to Travel
for Abortion, supra note 95, at 134. Irish President Mary Robinson stated: "We are exper-
iencing as a people a very deep crisis in ourselves .... We must move on to a more
compassionate society." Jones, supra note 26, at 1. An editorial in the Irish Times asked:
"What has been done to this Irish Republic, what sort of state has it become that in 1992 its
full panoply of authority, its police, its law officers, its courts are mobilised to condemn a
fourteen-year-old child to the ordeal of pregnancy and childbirth after rape at the hands of
a 'depraved and evil man."' Descent into Nightmare and Cruelty; How an Irish Times Edito-
rial Reacted to the Court Ban on Abortion for a 14-Year-Old Rape Victim, GUARDIAN, Feb.
19, 1992, at 19. The Irish Independent branded the case a tragedy of our times. Chris
Parkin, Irish Papers Slam Rape Victim Abortion Ban, PRESs Ass'N NnwsmLE, Feb. 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PANEWS File.
97. Att'y Gen. v. X and Others, reprinted in McDonagh, supra note 25, at 47.
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the propriety of barring women from travelling abroad for abor-
tions." It did not address the EC law issues that such an injunction
would necessarily raise. Instead, the Court decided the case as if X
were seeking an abortion within Ireland. It held that abortion is
permissble where there is a real and substantial threat to the life of the
mother that can be avoided only through abortion. 9 X had
threatened to commit suicide if she were forced to bear the child, and
the Court found this a real and substantial threat to her life.1°* At the
same time, however, the Court stressed that a threat to the mother's
mental or physical health, as distinct from a threat to her life, would
not justify an abortion.''
The X decision resolved what had become an internationally
watched crisis in the only way possible-by allowing X to have an
abortion. But neither the anti-abortion nor the pro-choice forces were
pleased with the decision. The pro-life contingent was outraged that
the Court had for the first time authorized abortion within Ireland.
Pro-choice forces were equally troubled by the Court's suggestion that
in other circumstances women could be restrained from travelling
outside Ireland to obtain a lawful abortion.102
While the X litigation formally ended at the Irish Supreme Court,
it had repercussions both for Ireland's relations with the EEC and for
the Open Door case, which at the time of the X decision was still
waiting to be argued before the ECHR. In both contexts, the X deci-
sion required the Irish government to retreat from earlier absolutist
positions regarding its authority to prohibit activities relating to
abortion.
98. Three of the five Justices (Fmlay, CJ., Hederman, J., and Egan, J.) stated in dicta
that under Irish constitutional law, Ireland could restrain a woman's travel in appropriate
circumstances in order to vindicate the right to life of the unborn. Att'y Gen. v. X and
Others, reprinted in McDonagh, supra note 25, at 64 (Fimlay, J.); id. at 102 (Egan, L.); id. at
80-81 (Hederman, J.). See also CASEY, supra note 8, at 348. The Justices reasoned that
where the constitutional right to life of the unborn conflicts with the constitutional right to
travel, the former must prevail. However, none of the Justices expressed an opinion as to
whether such an injunction on travel would be permissible under the Treaty of Rome.
99. Att'y Gen. v. X and Others, reprinted in McDonagh, supra note 25, at 60. Chief
Justice Finlay justified this test in part by emphasizing the wide range of relational interests
that are implicated in considering the life of the mother. He stated that the Court must
"concern itself with the position of the mother within a family group, with persons on
whom she is dependent, with, in other instances, persons who are dependent upon her and
her interactions with other citizens and members of society in the areas in %hich her activi-
ties occur." Id.
100. Id. at 61-62.
101. 1& at 60.
102. CAsEY, supra note 8, at 348-49.
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When the X action first arose, Ireland was in the midst of seeking
its citizens' approval of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht
Treaty),10 3 which was designed to promote an economic, monetary,
and political union among European nations. During the negotiation
of that treaty, Ireland sought to insulate its abortion laws from liberal-izing European influences and to separate the economic decision to
remain in the EEC from the moral issue of abortion. To this end, the
Irish government secured a special protocol, protocol 17, which pro-
vided that nothing in the EEC Treaties "shall affect the application in
Ireland of article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland."'1 4
When X was decided, however, the Irish government's strategy
backfired, and the Maastricht Treaty and its special protocol became a
flashpoint for abortion politics. Those pro-choice and anti-abortion
advocates dissatisfied with the X decision were concerned that adopt-
ing protocol 17 would effectively freeze the unhappy status quo.105
Moreover, public reaction against the government's position in X had
made it clear that the public did not favor restricting a woman's right
to travel abroad for an abortion. In Ireland, the Maastricht Treaty,
which promised substantial economic benefits for Ireland, had to be
approved by a majority of voters in a public referendum. 106 Con-
cerned that the abortion issue would cause the Maastricht Treaty to be
rejected, the government assured the populace that it would introduce
a separate referendum to permit women to travel abroad for abortions
and to obtain information about abortions abroad.0 7 At the same
time, the Irish government added to protocol 17 a "solemn declara-
tion" stating that the intention of the protocol's drafters was "not [to]
limit freedom either to travel between Member States or, in accord-
ance with conditions which may be laid down, in conformity with
Community law, by Irish legislation, to obtain or make available in
Ireland, information relating to services lawfully available in Member
States." 108
Thus, the X case caused the government to execute a 180-degree
reversal of its position on abortion in the Maastricht Treaty. The case
103. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [MAASTRICHT TREATY].
104. MAAsTmcHT TREATY, protocol 17 [Regarding Ireland]. See also CAsEY, supra
note 8, at 352; Ireland: Battle of Maastricht, EcONOMIsT, Feb. 29, 1992, at 55.
105. Ireland: Battle of Maastricht, supra note 104, at 55; Dick Walsh, Pro-life and Anti-
Maastricht, 5 NEw STATESMAN & Soc'Y 12-13 (1992).
106. Ireland; Make O'Break, EcONOMIST, June 13, 1992, at 56.
107. Walsh, supra note 105, at 13.
108. MAASTmClT TREATY, protocol 17 [Regarding Ireland], quoted in CASEY, supra
note 8, at 352-53.
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effectively transformed a government initiative to immunize Ireland's
restrictive abortion laws from European influence into a reluctant
agreement to liberalize Ireland's abortion laws by guaranteeing access
to Europe in exchange for its own citizens' approval of a European
treaty. The Treaty was approved, and a referendum on abortion was
scheduled for November.'" In the meantime, the ECHR finally is-
sued its decision in the case that began this story, Open Door.""0
D. Open Door Revisited
The implications of the X decision for the ongoing Open Door
litigation were technically narrow but conceptually significant. Once
the Irish Supreme Court had ruled that abortion was lawful in certain
circumstances, Ireland could no longer defend the full scope of the
Open Door injunction. At oral argument before the ECHR, Ireland's
attorneys conceded that at least where women were entitled under
Irish law to have an abortion, they would also be entitled to informa-
tion about abortion clinics."' In one sense this was a narrow conces-
sion, for an injunction so limited would still bar the vast majority of
women from receiving such information. But the concession was con-
ceptually significant because it undercut the absolutist position that
Ireland had to that point advanced. Ireland's argument-successful in
both the High Court and the Supreme Court-rested on the absolute
primacy of the right to life of the unborn. The X case demonstrated
that even within Irish domestic law, such primacy was not absolute.
While the ECHR noted Ireland's X-based concession,112 it did
not limit its decision to that narrow ground, but invalidated the injunc-
tion in its entirety. Nor did the Court adopt the Commission's tactic
of declaring the restriction too vague and sidestepping the difficult
question whether a more carefully drafted prohibition would pass
muster. Instead, the Court addressed the issue on its merits and held
that the injunction was not "necessary in a democratic society" to fur-
ther Ireland's legitimate purposes." 3
109. French Vote Next - Economic Opportuniky Fuels Irish Endorsement, SEATrE
Tams, June 24, 1992, at A10; Irish Move to the Left and Back Freedom to Travel for Abor-
don, Eur. Info. Service, Eu. REP., Dec. 2, 1992, § 1.
110. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
111. Id. at 17. Although abortion is now legal in Ireland in certain instances, no hospi-
tals or doctors perform abortions in Ireland, so women seeking abortions must still leave
the country to obtain an abortion. See O'Callaghan, supra note S.
112. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30.
113. Id.
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The Court accepted that Ireland had a legitimate aim in adopting
the injunction, because protection of the unborn child was predicated
on the Irish community's profound moral values concerning the na-
ture of life, as reflected in the 1983 referendum. The Court also ac-
knowledged that, in general, it affords Member States a wide margin
of discretion on questions involving the protection of morals within
their respective communities. Nonetheless, the Court insisted that
this margin of discretion was not absolute and was ultimately subject
to the Court's oversight. Applying that oversight, the Court found
that the injunction was not justified because Ireland allowed
thousands of women to travel abroad to obtain abortions, had con-
ceded that a bar on abortion information to all pregnant women was
not justified, and had not disputed that resourceful women could get
this information in other ways. The effect of the restriction appeared
to be not so much to protect the unborn as to relegate women to less
healthy and safe sources for obtaining information about abortion
clinics.
Like the clinics' arguments, the Court's rationale was predicated
in large part on the existence of lawful abortion in other Community
states and the relative openness of communication between Member
States. The Court's reasons turned more on the practical effect of the
existence of other freedoms than on the moral or normative impera-
tive of allowing free information. In one sense, the Court engaged in
bootstrapping, inasmuch as it justified the affirmance of a human right
to information by pointing to the inevitable pressures created by the
availability of abortion in other Member States. But, in another
sense, the Court's analysis was more than bootstrapping, for the Court
gave formal legal recognition to the right of free exchange of informa-
tion across borders within the EC, even where that free exchange
threatened a Member State's moral commitments.
The timing of the Court's decision was quite bold. When Ireland
announced that it would hold a constitutional referendum on, among
other things, the right to information about lawful abortion services in
other countries, it appeared likely that the ECHR would await the
results of that referendum before issuing its decision. But the Court
issued its ruling on October 29, 1992, less than one month before the
referendum.? 4
114. The Court may have seen this as an opportunity to strengthen its symbolic author-
ity on human rights matters. By deciding the matter before the Irish referendum was voted
upon, the Court "allowed" Ireland a convenient opportunity to comply with its decision.
The Court had reason to be concerned about Ireland's willingness to comply with its deci-
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In other respects, the ECHR was not so bold. It went out of its
way to avoid all questions that related directly to abortion, including
two questions that it had no valid reason to avoid. It declined to de-
cide whether Ireland had a legitimate aim in protecting the "rights of
others," which would have required determining whether fetuses con-
stitute "others" under the Convention. The Court reasoned that be-
cause it had found that the law had one legitimate aim-the
protection of morals-it did not need to consider any other proposed
aims. However, that reasoning assumes that all aims weigh equally in
a Court's analysis of a restriction, an assumption that seems unwar-
ranted. If fetuses count as "others," it is certainly a stronger argument
to assert that the law was required to save the lives of "others" than to
claim that it was required to protect morals.llS
The Court also declined to decide whether article 2's protection
of the "right to life" included the unborn because the clinics did not
argue that women have a right to abortion. But the article 2 argument
was advanced by Ireland as a defense to the clinics' claims that Ireland
had violated their freedom of expression. Ireland argued that because
article 2 protected the right to life of the unborn, it was justified in
enjoining information that would threaten that right.'1 6 Thus, the
Court's excuse for failing to resolve the article 2 issue was a non-
sequitur." 7
It should not be a surprise that the Court studiously avoided adju-
dicating any issues directly touching on the status of the fetus under
the Convention. As Glendon's study demonstrates, the EC states
have adopted a range of different legal responses to the issue of abor-
sions. In 1989, the Court had declared Ireland's criminal prohibition on homosexual sex
between consenting adults a violation of article 8 of the Convention, Norris v. Ireland, 13
E.H.RtRt 186 (1989), yet Ireland took four years to comply ith the Court's decision by
repealing its ban. Marie O'Halloran, Bill on Homosexuality Passes Second Stage, In.
Tamms, June 30, 1993, at 4.
115. The Court might have reasoned that since it found that the restriction was not
narrowly tailored to protect (or was not effective in protecting) the lives of the unborn, it
would not have mattered whether Ireland's aim was classified as protecting 'others" or
"morals." However, where the aim of a law is to protect lives, a looser fit may be justified
given the importance of the goal.
116. Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28.
117. In fact, the clinics did argue that women have a right to abortion under article 8 of
the Convention, which guarantees the "right to respect for... private and family life," Id.
at 32. The Court also declined to decide this claim (although this avoidance was more
justified), because once the Court had ruled for the clinics on the free expression claim, no
purpose would have been served by considering their article 8 claim. Id.
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tion.1" 8 Moreover, following the fall of communism in Central and
Eastern Europe, the Council of Europe has opened its membership to
the former East Bloc nations as well, 119 greatly increasing the diversity
of views on abortion in the Community. 2 ' One of the many lessons
of Roe v. Wade12 (and of Brown v. Board of Education,122 for that
matter) is that a judicially-imposed solution to a controversial issue
like abortion may test a court's legitimacy. Given the ECHR's reli-
ance on Member States' voluntary compliance with its decisions, the
Court may well feel that it cannot impose a uniform solution to the
abortion issue, even if it could agree on one. In any event, the Court
has never decided an abortion case, and it went out of its way to re-
solve Open Door without directly addressing the matter.
Nonetheless, the ECHR's decision, while limited to a free expres-
sion rationale as a strictly legal matter, is certain to have a broader
impact on the ongoing struggle for reproductive rights in Ireland. By
requiring that the channels of communication on abortion be kept
open, the Court has maintained the possibility for change that the free
118. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 145-57; see also Blinken, supra note 26, at 12 (observing
that "[t]he European continent right now is a virtual schizophrenic on abortion rights").
119. GOMIEN, supra note 38, at 7.
120. The extent of potential conflicts is perhaps best exemplified by Germany, which
has been attempting to resolve sharp differences between the views of former East and
West Germany on abortion. Before the unification of Germany, East Germany permitted
abortion for any reason during the first trimester, while West Germany prohibited abortion
except in certain circumstances, such as endangerment to the mother's health, risk of dam-
age to the child, pregnancy resulting from rape, or a life situation that would make it diffi-
cult for the woman to raise a child. See Constitutional Court Debates the Abortion Issue;
Women Register Doubts About Judges' Neutrality, German Info. Center, THE WEEK IN
GERMANY, Dec. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WKGERM File.
After unification in June 1992, the German Bundestag adopted a compromise law
decriminalizing abortion during the first trimester, but requiring that pregnant women un-
dergo counselling and that the abortion be performed by a physician. Right-to-life politi-
cians challenged the law's constitutionality, and on May 28, 1993, Germany's highest court
declared the law unconstitutional because it violated a constitutional provision requiring
the state to protect human life. Ursula Knapp, German Court Overturns Liberal Abortion
Law, REMERS, May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS File. The
Bundestag must now revise its law to make abortion illegal but not criminal in the first
trimester. Women can still obtain abortions during this period, but only after a consulta-
tion with a doctor to make them "aware that the unborn child has its own right to life...
[and that] abortion can only be considered in exceptional circumstances." German Abor-
tions Ruled Unconstitutional But Women Won't Face Prosecution, Cm. TRm., May 29, 1993,
at 3. Because the Court has held that abortion is illegal (even if not criminal), health
insurance will not pay for the procedure, and state-supported hospitals will not perform it.
Id See also Stephen Kinzer, German Court Restricts Abortion Angering Feminists and the
East, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at 1.
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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exchange of information permits.123 Indeed, it was precisely to fore-
stall that possibility for change that the S.P.U.C. and other anti-abor-
tion groups in Ireland sought to enact and enforce the eighth
amendment to the Irish Constitution. 'The Court's decision keeps
open one of the paths to liberalization that the anti-abortion forces
sought to block.
E. The Political Aftermath The November Referendum
The culmination of the pressures begun by the X, Grogan, and
Open Door cases was the November 1992 constitutional referendum
on abortion." 4 The referendum put three proposed constitutional
amendments to the voters.125 The first two proposals effectively guar-
anteed that women would have the right to travel to other EC states
for abortions and that information about lawful abortion abroad
would be freely available in Ireland. 26 The third proposal, which
caused the government to call the ballot the "Pro-life Referendum'
(much to the horror of the anti-abortion forces), proposed the follow-
ing language to be added to article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution: "It
shall be unlawful to terminate the life of the unborn unless such termi-
nation is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the
mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise
to real and substantive risk to her life, not being a risk of self-
destruction.' z
The Irish government urged affirmative votes on all three provi-
sions.Y8 In essence, the government was forced to reverse the posi-
tions it had taken on the central European-Irish issues at stake in
123. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(observing that "[tihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market"); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (noting that "[flreedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth").
124. James F. Clarity, Ireland Renews Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1992, at
AS.
125. ld.
126. The first proposed amendment provided: "There shall be no limit on freedom to
travel to another country." The second proposed amendment read: "There shall be no
limit on freedom to obtain or make available, subject to conditions laid down by law, infor-
mation on services lawfully available in another member State [of the European Commu-
nity]." I&
127. Clare Boylan, Eire: The Hardest Labour of All-Abortion, GtmLAv, Nov. 25,
1992, at 1.
128. "The Taoiseach [the Prime Minister] said that he would be campaigning for a 'Yes'
vote on all three questions." Denis Coghlan, Reynolds Stands by the Fdamental Princi-
ples, In. Tnms, Oct. 10, 1992, at 5.
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Open Door, Grogan, and X. It abandoned its efforts to restrict either
information about abortions abroad or the right to travel abroad to
obtain an abortion. At the same time, however, the Irish government
sought to limit the effect of the X decision on Ireland's domestic pro-
hibition of abortion, by ruling out the risk of suicide as a ground for
justifying abortion.
The Irish voters refused to accept the government's package deal.
Instead, they approved the first two proposals, and rejected the
third. 129 Over sixty-two percent of the voters voted to permit women
to travel abroad for an abortion, and sixty percent voted to make in-
formation on lawful abortion abroad freely available, but an even
higher percentage, 65.4 percent, voted to reject the government's at-
tempt to restrict abortions to save the life of the mother.130 The re-
suits, just nine years after the eighth amendment was approved by a
margin of more than two to one, were widely viewed as marking a
"sea-change" in Irish society.13 1 The November referendum reflected
an Irish public willing to acknowledge in an open, de jure manner the
"safety valve" that had previously been for the most part unspoken,
and available only to those in the "know." Moreover, the referendum
marked a resounding defeat for the anti-abortion forces that had at-
tempted to close that safety valve through restrictions on information
and travel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ireland's 1983 constitutional amendment to protect the right to
life of the unborn was enacted in large measure to insulate Irish abor-
tion laws from liberalizing pressures beyond its borders. Once the
129. Irish Move to the Left and Back Freedom to Travel for Abortion, Eur. Info. Service
(EIS), EUR. REP., Dec. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EIS File, Pressure to
meet EC standards on travel and to have access to information about abortion abroad
reportedly made the first two proposals appear very straightforward to most Irish. How-
ever, both pro-choice and pro-life advocates urged a "no" vote on the third proposal. Pro-
life adherents would not acknowledge any exceptions on abortion, while reproductive
rights advocates felt the third proposal provided too few exceptions. Kevin Cullen, Irish
Vote Today on Abortion Law, BosToN GLOBE, Nov. 25, 1992, at 2; Abortion Referendum,
IR. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at 15.
130. Irish Move to the Left and Back Freedom to Travel for Abortion, supra note 129.
131. See, e.g., Jill Serjeant, Legal Abortion on the Way Despite Irish 'No' Vote, REtrrnns
LIBR. REp., Nov. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File (observing
that "[w]hat is clear is that there has been a sea-change in Irish society since the 1983
referendum enshrined the rigid ban on abortion"); Andrew Phillips, A New Shade of




amendment was adopted, anti-abortion forces sought to use it to ex-
tend Ireland's abortion prohibitions abroad, by barring both travel for
abortions and information about lawful abortion in other countries.
Each attempt backfired, resulting ultimately in official legal acknowl-
edgment that Ireland lives in a European Community where other na-
tions permit abortion, and that Irish citizens have a right to know
about and avail themselves of those abortion services. A practice that
had previously been silently tolerated-"going to England"-became
a recognized legal right, and Ireland's domestic restrictions on abor-
tion were liberalized for the first time. By the end of the story, anti-
abortion forces were fighting against a Maastricht Treaty protocol
designed to insulate Irish abortion law from European oversight be-
cause they were no longer satisfied with the state of Irish abortion law
itself.
The story of the eighth amendment suggests the difficulty of
moral isolationism in the EC. As long as the Community guarantees
freedom of travel and exchange of information between Member
States, what is legal in one country is available to the citizens of other
countries. Ireland can regulate what goes on within its borders, but
cannot regulate its citizens' activities in England, Wales, or France.
Nor can Ireland escape the pressures that the availability of lawful
abortion in neighboring states exerts on its own legal culture. In at-
tempting to insulate itself not only from the legal developments of
Europe, but also from the practical effects of lawful abortion readily
available in neighboring EC countries, Ireland was ultimately forced
to liberalize its own abortion laws and to acknowledge formally the
unstated route by which thousands of Irish women obtain lawful abor-
tions every year.
The chronicle of Ireland's abortion restrictions also illustrates the
complex interrelationship between international law and international
travel and communication. In this account, international law worked
hand-in-hand with the reality of increased interchange between na-
tions. The existence of relatively easy travel and communication not
only undermined Ireland's practical ability to restrict its own citizens'
freedoms, but also proved fatal to its attempts to justify its actions as a
matter of international law under the European Convention. In turn,
the freedom of communication guaranteed by the European Conven-
tion has had practical effects on the abortion issue in Ireland in part
because technology has made communication and travel easier. As
interchange between nations becomes more readily available, the
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force of international law becomes less a matter of moral persuasion
and more a matter of practical reality.
In the Irish abortion example, international pressure was liberal-
izing, but it need not always be so. In March 1993, Poland amended
its abortion law to end thirty-seven years of abortion on demand.
Abortion is now permitted only in very limited circumstances.13 2 At
the same time, in order to halt "abortion tourism" from neighboring
Poland, the Czech Republic reaffirmed a 1986 law that prohibits for-
eigners from having abortions in the Czech Republic. The Minister of
Health stated that "[i]f we start promoting imported abortions it could
provoke conservative Catholics and lead to more strict conditions in
this country."'1 33 In this instance, the pressure of a neighboring coun-
try seems to be running in the opposite direction.
Thus, while the Irish abortion story suggests the inevitability of
international influence, the emerging Czech-Poland story suggests that
such influence will not always be liberalizing. Rather, the interrelated
forces of international law and international exchange are likely to
pull nations outside of the mainstream toward the consensus view of
the relevant international community. On the abortion front, these
forces may be more likely to rein in the ends of Professor Glendon's
continuum 134 than to shift the continuum in one direction or another.
132. The new law permits abortion only when pregnancy endangers a woman's life or is
the result of rape or incest, the fetus is irreparably damaged, or an abortion is necessary as
an emergency procedure to save the woman's life. The acting doctor as well as two other
doctors must certify that the woman's life is in danger, and prenatal tests are required to
show the fetus is irreparably damaged. John Darnton, Abortion in Poland: Restrictive Law
is Denounced, CHI. Tam., Mar. 28, 1993, at 4.
133. Cynthia Durcanin, Abortion in the Czech Republic: Foreigners Keep Out, WARSAW
Voica, May 2, 1993.
134. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 14.
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